Economic Model for Vehicle Ownership Quota Policies and Applications in China  by Zhu, Shanjiang et al.
 Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  96 ( 2013 )  2867 – 2883 
1877-0428 © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Chinese Overseas Transportation Association (COTA).
doi: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2013.08.319 
ScienceDirect
13th COTA International Conference of Transportation Professionals (CICTP 2013) 
Economic Model for Vehicle Ownership Quota Policies and 
Applications in China 
Shanjiang Zhua, Longyuan Dub Chenfeng Xiongc, Lei Zhangd*
aAssistant Professor, Department of Civil, Environmental, and Infrastructure Engineering, George Mason University, Ng, Suite 1300, George 
Mason Univeristy, MSN-6C1, Fairfax, VA 22030, USA 
bGraduate Research Assistant, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Maryland, 1173 Glenn L. Martin Hall, 
College Park, MD 20742, USA 
cGraduate Research Assistant, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Maryland, 1173 Glenn L. Martin Hall, 
College Park, MD 20742, USA 
dAssistant Professor, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Maryland, 1173 Glenn L. Martin Hall, College Park, 
MD 20742, USA 
Abstract 
Traffic congestion has caused huge economic loss and environmental pollution every year. As a demand management policy 
to reduce congestion, vehicle ownership quota system that directly controls the number of vehicles on the road has recently 
been adopted in some metropolitan areas including Beijing and Shanghai. When it comes to implementation of quota system, 
Beijing uses the plate lottery system, so that everyone interested in owning a vehicle can participate and there's no monetary 
transaction in the process. Shanghai, on the other hand, uses the plate auction system and participants bid for the limited 
number of vehicle plates available. This paper aims at building a theoretical model that quantitatively analyzes the benefits of 
such policies. This study extends the joint decision model of vehicle ownership and mileage model, and applied compensating 
variation method to measure the net social impact change of the different quota systems. Under this proposed framework, a 
numerical demonstration is conducted. 
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.  
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Chinese Overseas Transportation Association (COTA). 
Keywords: Transportation economics; Vehicle ownership quota; Policy; Welfare analysis 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-301-405-2881 
E-mail address: lei@umd.edu 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
13 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
ction and peer-r view under responsibility of Chinese Overseas Transportation Associati (COTA).
2868   Shanjiang Zhu et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  96 ( 2013 )  2867 – 2883 
1. Introduction 
Over the years, along with the progress of motorization and urbanization, traffic congestion has become an 
ever more serious issue worldwide, especially in the metropolitan areas. According to the 2011 TTi Annual 
Report Schrank et al. (2011) congestion in metropolitan areas in US results in 1.94 billion gallons in wasted fuel 
and $100.9 billion in total cost. In Sao Paolo, Brazil, cost of traffic congestion is nearly 20 billion US dollars in 
2008. China, as one of the fast growing economies in the world, is also witnessing more severe traffic congestion. 
Congestion cost in Beijing, Guangzhou and Shanghai, three of the largest metropolitan cities in China, is more 
than 200 CNY per person per month. 
Under this background, various policy tools (e.g. priority transit, high occupancy vehicle lanes, congestion 
pricing) have been proposed and implemented to mitigate congestion by allocating scarce road space more 
efficiently. Congestion pricing, as one of the means for transportation demand management, has been 
implemented in a number of urban areas including Singapore, London, and Stockholm. Singapore first introduced 
the Area License Scheme (ALS) in 1975. The scheme requires vehicles entering the central "Restricted Zone" 
during peak hours to purchase a license. Starting from 1998, ALS has been replaced by the new Electrical Road 
Pricing scheme (ERP). Using microwave technology, tolls are collected on arterials and expressways that vary by 
time of day. Stockholm and London have implemented similar congestion charging schemes using automatic 
plate number recognition technologies. 
More recently, some cities, especially in developing countries, started looking at alternatives that directly 
control the number of vehicles on the road. In 1989, Mexico City imposed a regulation that limits each car from 
driving on a specific day of the week according to their license plate number ("Day without a Car") (Eskeland & 
Feyzioglu, 1997). Similar road space rationing policies have been implemented in Sao Paolo and Beijing during 
the 2008 Olympic Game (Lim, 2011). 
Also, more drastic policies that restrict vehicle ownerships have been adopted by several cities. For example, 
Singapore implemented the Vehicle Quota System (VQS) in 1990 (Barter, 2005). The VQS sets a quota to the 
number of new vehicles to be registered in Singapore each year. Households need to bid for a Certificate of 
Entitlement (COE) through online auction system in order to own a vehicle. With this quota system and road 
pricing policy, fewer than 30% of Singaporeans own a vehicle. Along with the fast economic development, China 
is also experiencing rapid increase in motor vehicle ownership. Similar to Singapore, started from 1994, 
Shanghai implemented the New Plate Auction system, by auctioning the new vehicle plate license. Instead of 
auctioning, Beijing started implemented a plate lottery system in 2010, limiting the number of plates issued to 
passenger vehicles to 20,000 per month. Vehicle ownership quota as a direct travel demand management tool 
could be adopted by more metropolitan areas, either as a permanent policy or as a temporary policy during 
special events. Under this background, it is important to look into the impacts of such policies. 
Both theoretical and empirical studies on road pricing have been abundant in the literature (e.g. Brownstone & 
Small, 2005; Verhoef, 2002; Zhang & Ge, 2004). In contrast, fewer studies have been conducted to evaluate 
rationing as a policy tool to address congestion problem, although its role in resource allocation has been widely 
discussed in other industries (e.g. Evans, 1983). A pioneering study in transportation by Daganzo (1995) shows 
that a Pareto optimum congestion reduction scheme can be built by combining rationing and pricing. Nakamura 
& Kockelman (2002) tested this theoretical framework on the San Francisco Bay Bridge corridor. The authors 
pointed out several limitations in current studies and recommended further research in this field. Smith & Chin 
(1997) concluded that the VQS in Singapore is effective in controlling traffic, but it has to be complemented by 
road pricing to yield higher net social impact. Wang (2010) did a qualitative investigation into different traffic 
demand management policies including ownership quota systems. Eskeland & Feyzioglu (1997) did an empirical 
study in the Mexico City "Day without a Car" policy, and found that households purchase a second car to get 
around this policy, making the congestion reduction effect insignificant.  Zhu et al. (2012) examined the vehicle 
rationing and vehicle ownership policy with a theoretical model, under the assumption that users are 
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homogeneous. Their conclusion is that under this assumption, vehicle ownership quota will always generate a 
positive net social impact, while vehicle usage restriction with induced demand considered will result in a 
negative net social impact. Furthermore, congestion pricing will outperform both rationing policies in terms of 
net social impact. 
This study extends the theoretical model of Zhu et al. (2012) to evaluate the welfare effects of the two quota 
policies and relaxed the assumption to heterogeneous user group. In order to consider the quota policy as a 
transportation demand management tool that mitigates traffic congestion, this study follows the indirect utility 
approach initiated by Dubin & McFadden (1984), and extends the model previously proposed by De Jong (1990) 
to consider the joint decisions of vehicle ownership and usage under the two vehicle quota systems. These 
demand-side models are then combined with supply-side models to capture the market equilibrium.  Net social 
impact is then calculated for each of the quota regulations as an evaluation of the effectiveness. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
For a traveler who is facing various rationing policies, the decision of owning a vehicle and the decision of 
using a vehicle are interrelated. Households will evaluate their car buying decision based on how congested the 
roads are. If the operations cost gets higher, it will be less likely for a family to own a vehicle. On the other hand, 
after any kind of ownership quota policy is implemented, mitigation effect on traffic congestion will result in 
induced demand, and more households will be willing to own vehicles. Therefore, to correctly capture these 
behavioral dynamics in reaction to rationing policy, it is crucial to jointly model vehicle ownership and usage 
decisions. 
The performance of the market dynamics should also depend on travel supply (the marginal cost of traveling). 
Effect of quota policies is dependent of the level of congestion in cities. To correctly model induced demand and 
capture network equilibria under different policies, we should integrate travel demand and supply models and 
generate market equilibrium in the analysis. 
2.1. Travel demand model 
This study follows the indirect utility approach initiated by Dubin & McFadden (1984) and extended by 
researchers including De Jong (1990); Goldberg (1998); Hensher et al. (1992); Mannering & Winston (1985); 
and West (2004) because of its solid foundation in consumer behavior theory (for a comprehensive review, see 
De Jong et al. 2004). We consider a household who seeks to maximize its utility under budget constraints. We 
consider two goods: vehicle usage (A) and all other goods (X). The household faces a discrete choice of owning 
vehicles and a continuous choice of vehicle usage conditional on the ownership choice. This joint decision gives 
the consumption of vehicle usage and determines vehicle ownership. The consumption of vehicle usage and all 
other goods yield positive marginal utility. 
To derive the model, we must first specify a functional form for conditional indirect utility, which has a one-
to-one correspondence with the demand function. A demand function linear in income and price has been used by 
Goldberg (1998); Hensher et al. (1992); Mannering & Winston (1985); West (2004). However, the demand could 
become negative as price increases under this specification. Also, the linear model cannot consider the option of 
not owning a vehicle. In contrast, De Jong (1990, 1996) adopted a double log specification, which is bounded to 
be positive and performs well in an early empirical study. Thus utility of not owning a vehicle can be derived. 
Therefore, this paper follows the second approach, while maintaining consistency in connotation with other 
literature whenever possible. 
From De Jong (1990), we assume the demand for driving Ai units of distance (e.g. measured in annual Vehicle 
Mile Traveled (VMT)) by a household i with annual income Yi is determined by: 
ln lni i i i iA Y C p e   (1) 
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Where p is the operating cost per mile for the vehicle; C represents the annualized capital cost of owning a car; 
ei summarizes unobserved household socio-economic and demographic characteristics, and ei ~ N(0, ). i and i 
are parameters. 
Following Burtless & Hausman (1978), the corresponding indirect utility function is: 
11 1, exp
1
i
i i i i
i i
V p Y C e p Y C  (2) 
We can easily verify this correspondence by applying Roy's identity to Equation 2, which gives the demand 
function 1. To derive the utility of owning no vehicle, De Jong (1990) observed that the optimal decision would 
be to not drive at all when operating cost per mile p goes to infinite. Therefore, we have: 
lim , 0,i ix V p Y U Y   (3) 
Which yields: 
110,
1
i
i i
i
U Y Y   (4) 
Thus, the probability of owning a car is: 
1 11 1 1exp
1 1
P p P Y C e p Y  (5) 
Denote: 
11log log 1 logY Y C  (6) 
Then, the probability function (5) can be simplified: 
1 pP p   (7) 
In this study, it is assumed that households have a uniform income level Y, although this framework is capable 
to consider heterogeneous income level. Also we will first only consider one traveler/vehicle per household and 
leave the complexity of intra-household travel behavior for future research. In the following sections, the word 
traveler or household will be used interchangeably. Also, because of (1), average VMT for the driving population 
is: 
2 2
2 1
|
1
p
i
pe
A p E A e p
p
 (8) 
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Combining (7) and (8), the aggregated demand is: 
2 2
1 2 1
p pq p H Y C e  (9) 
Figure 1 describes the aggregated demand curve: 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Aggregate demand curve with homogenous travelers 
2.2. Travel supply model 
To maintain the tractability of the analysis, we consider a stylized network with only one link and one origin-
destination pair. In the case of urban transportation network, when the trips are relatively evenly spread on the 
roads and the congestion is relatively similar among different links, such stylized network with one OD pair and a 
generalized capacity can be viewed as an abstract model for this urban transportation network. It should be noted 
that under model this framework, a real network supply model can potentially be implemented, and will be 
discussed briefly in Section 5. 
The total demand is carried by this idealized network, with road capacity (F). The generalized travel cost p is 
then a function of travel demand q. 
p t q   (10) 
where  is the value of time. To evaluate policies on the network with different levels of congestion, this study 
employs a generalized Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) function to describe the supply side. The total travel cost p 
is thus: 
0 1
qp T
F
  (11) 
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where: T0 captures the free flow time.  and  are parameters whose values allow us to model networks with 
different congestibility (travel time elasticity). In the most common BPR function,  = 0.15,  = 4. As this paper 
focuses on rationing policies and their impacts on market equilibrium, we assume other long term costs such as 
fuel price remain constant and become part of T0. 
2.3. Network equilibrium 
Based on the demand and supply models introduced in the previous subsection, this subsection analyzes 
market equilibrium conditions. The equilibrium point (p0, q0) is solved by the following equation set: 
2
0
2
/2 0
0
0
0 0
1
1
p pq H Y C e
qp T
F
 (12) 
Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium status when demand and supply curves intersect. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Network equilibrium 
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3. Models for Vehicle Plate Lottery and Plate Auction Policy Analysis 
In this section, two distinct ownership quota systems will be analyzed, namely the plate lottery system and 
plate auction system. From Equation (12), initially at equilibrium status, HP(p0) of the households are willing to 
own a vehicle. The quota policy will restrict the vehicle ownership, issuing (p0) vehicle plates. Here   (0, 1) 
will be a policy variable the authority need to decide on. 
3.1.  A Compensating Variation (CV) approach for welfare analysis 
In previous studies, researchers have used consumer surplus (CS) to conduct social welfare analysis. 
Consumer surplus is an approximation for the willingness-to-pay (WTP) welfare measurement. It has a very 
straightforward graph implementation, which is the triangular area below demand curve and above the price line. 
However in this study, since Equations (2) and (4) are different in functional form and are not continuous when 
q , consumer surplus is not applicable. 
Instead in this study, compensating variation (CV) from Hicks (1946) is used. It is defined as the money to be 
taken away from (or paid to when it is negative) the individual after an economic change, that leaves the 
individual with the same utility value as before. Small & Rosen (1981) extended such welfare calculation method 
to discrete choice models. Mannering & Winston (1987) and Winston & Mannering (1984) have applied CV in 
transportation research regime. 
3.2. Vehicle plate lottery system 
In this model, zero entry fee to the lottery is always assumed. In fact, in places where the lottery is actually 
implemented, the entry fee is neglect-able comparing to household income. Also, the plates obtained from the 
lottery are not transferable. This prevents the underground trading of the plates. 
 portion of the households who initially own vehicles will be rationed out, the roads will get less 
congested. Thus, more households will be interested in the joining the lottery. A policy maker can decide the 
population this plate lottery is open to. In the following deduction, two different implementations will be 
considered. First is that this lottery will be open to the general public. This is what the Beijing authority adopts. 
 
Case 1: Lottery open to the general public 
 
If the authority opens the plate lottery to everyone, a new equilibrium point (p*, q*) will be achieved.  From 
Equation (7), HP(p*) will enter the lottery to win the (p0) number of vehicle plates. From Equation (8), their 
average VMT is Ã(p*). Thus, the new aggregated demand function will be: 
2 2
2
1 0
1
1
1
p pe
pq H Y C
p
 (13) 
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The new equilibrium is given by the following equation set: 
2
0/2 * 2
0* 0
0 *
0
*
* 0
0 0
1 /
1
1 /
1
pe ppq H Y C
p
qp T
F
 (14) 
 
Since *0 0p p  and 
*
0 0P p P p , the probability of winning the lottery is: 
0
*
0
1
/
p
p
  (15) 
 
Now the task is to calculate welfare impact of the policy. For each of the households who initially do not own 
vehicles but enter the lottery system now and actually win it, their *0 0,ie p p . Since the 
probability of winning the lottery is given by Equation (15), the total number of such households is: 
*
0 0p pH   (16) 
 
Their individual i s compensating variation gain is given by the following equation: 
11 *
1 0
1 1 1 exp
1 1
i
iY Y CV C e p  (17) 
 
Thus, the CV change from this group of households is: 
2
0
2
*
0
1
1
0 1 * 2
1 0
1 1exp
2
ip e
i i
p
CV H Y C Y e p e de  (18) 
 
Then consider the households who initially own vehicles, their ei  ሾ  ൅ Ͳ, 
such households is: 
01 pH   (19) 
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 portion of them who fail the lottery, their individual compensating variation is given by the 
following equation: 
11
0 2
1 1 1exp
1 1
i
iY C e p Y CV  (20) 
 
2
2
*
0
1
110 2
2 0
1 11 exp
2
ie
i i
p
CV H Y Y C e p e de  (21) 
Then for the  portion of them who actually win the lottery, their individual compensating variation is given 
by the following equation: 
11 *
0 3 0
1 1 1 1exp exp
1 1
i
i iY C e p Y C CV e p  (22) 
 
2
* 20 0
0
1
110 2
3
1 1
2
i
i
e
e p p
i
p
CV H Y C Y C e e e e de  (23) 
The CV change for the whole society is thus calculated by adding three portions together: 
0 0 0 0
1 2 3CV CV CV CV   (24) 
In Equation (24), the first and third terms on the right hand side are positive because of the mitigation of 
congestion by the implementation of the quota system. The second term is negative due to the depriving from 
owning a vehicle. 
 
Case 2: Lottery open only to previous owners 
Another alternative for the lottery implementation is to open the system only to those who own vehicles in the 
initial equilibrium. This policy can be an applicable way for the authority to control the number of vehicles in an 
already well developed metropolitan area. So the authority stops issuing new plates and conduct a lottery within 
the current driving population. Government will buy back the vehicles of households who lose the lottery. Such 
policy has not been implemented in any area yet. This section focuses on the theoretical point of view and serves 
as a comparison to the lottery system that opens to the general public. 
For a given operation cost, the average VMT for household i who wins the lottery is: 
2
2
/2 01p pe   (25) 
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Thus the new aggregated demand function is given by: 
2 2
1 02 1
p pq H Y C e  (26) 
 
Under this policy, the equilibrium is given by the following equation set: 
2 *
0
1 /2* 2
0 0
* *
0 0 0
1 /
1 /
pq H Y C e p
p T q F
 (27) 
 
For the household i in the  portion who win the lottery, its compensating variation is given by: 
11 *
0 0
1 1 1 1exp exp
1 1
i
i iY C e p Y C CV e p  (28) 
 
The aggregate CV change from this group of households is: 
2
* 20 0
0
1
110 21 1
2
i
i
e
e p p
i
p
CV H Y C Y C e e e e de  (29) 
 
For the households i in the 1   portion who do not win the lottery, its compensating variation is given by: 
11
0 1
1 1 1exp
1 1
i
iY C e p Y CV  (30) 
 
The aggregate CV change from this group of households is: 
2
20
0
1
110 2
1
1 11
2
i
i
e
e p
i
p
CV H Y Y C e e de  (31) 
 
The CV change for the whole society is thus calculated by adding these two portions together: 
0 0 0
1CV CV CV   (32) 
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3.3. Vehicle plate auction system 
In this section, we will consider a sealed-bid auction system that the first (p0) best prices will win the 
auction, and therefore get to own a vehicle. 
To quantitatively model this system, it is assumed in this work that the population size H is large, and for each 
individual i, he/she knows his/her own ei as well as the distribution of ei (N(0, ) in this case). 
The valuation for the plate V(ei) for each individual i is: 
*
1
1
1 1 i ae p
iV e Y C Y e   (33) 
 
where pa is the operation cost per mile; and the * indicates equilibrium status. 
When the price of the plate is V(ei), household i is indifferent between owning and not owning a vehicle. 
Based on these assumptions, in the equilibrium status, the plate will go to those who has higher V(ei) which is 
equivalent to the higher ei. the individuals who will get the plate has 
*
i ae e . 
*
ae  is given by: 
*
0
1 /
1
ae
p
  (34) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*
ae  is solely determined by the initial equilibrium status before any quota policy as well as the quota portion . 
It can be shown that under equilibrium status, households with *i ae e  will all submit 
*
aV e , while those with 
*
i ae e  will submit aV e . As a matter of fact, since for any individual household with 
*
i ae e , paying 
*
aV e  guarantees a plate. Paying more than that amount will decrease its utility. Paying less than that amount 
results in failing to get the plate. Either way, this household would be worse off should it deviate with this 
strategy. For any individual household with *i ae e , submitting iV e  means it will not get the plate. Paying 
more than iV e means it will be worse off than not owning a vehicle even if it wins the lottery. Paying less 
than iV e , and this household still don't get the plate. This means those households won't have incentive to 
deviate with this strategy. Thus Nash equilibrium has been found. From empirical results, the average and lowest 
winning bid of the Shanghai vehicle plate auction do not differ a lot. This implies that the assumptions and 
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deduction of the auction model has the representation power of the real world case. Denote *aV e V . The 
equilibrium status * *, ,a ap q V  can be calculated as: 
2 *
* *
1 /2* * 2
* *
0 0
1 1
1 /
1 /
1 1 1
1 1
a
a a
p
a a
a
e p
q H Y V C e e
p T q F
Y V C e Y
 (35) 
For each *0[ , )i ae p e . 
Their individual compensating variation gain 1
iCV  is given by the following equation: 
11
0 1
1 1 1exp
1 1
i
iY C e p Y CV  (36) 
By aggregating the 1
iCV  
* 2
20
0
1
11 2
1
1 1
2
a i
i
e e
e pa
i
p
CV H Y Y C e e de  (37) 
For each of the households who wins the auction, their *i ae e . Their individual compensating variation gain 
iCV  is given by the following equation: 
11 *
0 0
1 1 1 1exp exp
1 1
i
i iY C e p Y S C CV e p  (38) 
By aggregating the iCV  
2
* 20 0
*
1
11 21 1
2
i
i
a
e
e p pa
i
e
CV H Y S C Y C e e e e de  (39) 
Also, the revenue generated from the auction is: 
01 pR S   (40) 
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The welfare change for the whole society is thus: 
1
a a aCV CV CV R   (41) 
4. Numerical Example 
In this section, numerical analysis will be conducted to look into the welfare implications of the quota 
systems. This study uses parameters reported by De Jong (1990): 
 Income elasticity of driving:  = 0.49 
 Price elasticity of driving:  = 0.028 
 Average annual income Y = 35000 
 Vehicle Price averaged in years C = 2536 
We also set the parameters for supply-side function as:  = 4 and  = 0.15 in Equation (11), which is a typical 
BPR function. We assume the free flow operation cost 0 to be $5 and capacity F to be 30H for convenience. 
With these parameters set up, the initial equilibrium can be calculated by Equation (12). Under equilibrium 
status, 59% of the households will choose to own a vehicle. The operation cost per mile p0 = 27.5. Previous 
sections has discussed welfare change calculations of the two plate lottery systems (open to general public and 
open only to previous vehicle owners) and the plate auction system. Since all three policies limits the number of 
vehicles on the road, a good comparison of the three will be the compensating variation under the same quota 
percentage . 
 
 
Fig. 3. Compensating variation comparison of the policies 
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From Figure 3, we can see that lottery that opens only to previous vehicle owners always outperform lottery 
that opens to the general public in terms of welfare gain. This is because more households with lower preference 
of driving ei will be attracted to the lottery knowing that there will be less congestion. In fact, when the quota 
ratio is 0.8, which means to limit the number of vehicles to 80%, the probability of winning this lottery is only 
47%. As lottery is purely random, the 53% of the households who have high preference of driving but cannot 
own vehicles will contribute a big welfare loss, comparing to the welfare gain generated by the 47% of the 
households with lower preference of driving and then win the lottery. The welfare gain from the households who 
don't previously own vehicles but enter and win the lottery now is 30.1H, whereas the welfare loss from the 
households who previously own vehicles but don't win the lottery is as much as 321H. 
Plate auction system, comparing to both lottery systems, enjoys a higher welfare gain. The auction mechanism 
guarantees that households with higher preferences of driving will always get the plate. Such arrangement may 
result in less effective congestion mitigation, as the individuals with higher preference of driving will drive more. 
But since households will have to surrender part of their salary in order to get the plate, this will indirectly help 
reduce traffic congestion. 
The mitigation effect of each of the policies can be examined in terms of the operation cost per mile at 
equilibrium. From Figure 4, lottery that opens to the general public is most effective in congestion mitigation, 
whereas auction will result in a relatively higher congestion level. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Level of congestion comparison of the policies 
 
From Figure 3, under this set of parameters, we can see that lottery system that opens to the general public will 
always generate negative net social impact. Next we look at another hypothetical supply model of a more 
congestible road with higher marginal cost. Figure 5 shows the net social impact under the set of supply curve 
parameters as  = 8 and F remains 30H. From Figure 5, we can see that lottery system that opens to general 
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public will be able to generate a positive welfare gain. Comparing Figure 3 and 5, we can observe that a more 
congestible supply model will offer a higher welfare gain. 
Unlike lottery system, welfare gain of the auction system comes from the revenue collected from selling the 
vehicle plates. In fact, when looking all households will have a lower utility level after the auction policy is 
implemented. Figure 6 shows the revenue generated from auction under different quota ratios. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Compensating variation comparison of the policies under highly congestible supply side parameters 
 
Fig. 6. Revenue generated from auction 
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5. Conclusion 
Traffic congestion has caused huge economic loss and environmental pollution every year. As a transportation 
demand management policy to reduce congestion, vehicle ownership quota system, that directly controls the 
number of vehicles on the road, has recently been adopted in some metropolitan areas, including Beijing and 
Shanghai. When it comes to implementation of quota system, Beijing uses the plate lottery system, so that 
everyone interested in owning a vehicle can participate and there's no monetary transaction in the process. 
Shanghai, on the other hand, uses the plate auction system and participants bid for the limited number of vehicle 
plates available. This paper aims at building a theoretical model that quantitatively analyzes the benefits of such 
policies. 
This study extends the joint decision model of vehicle ownership and mileage model, and applied 
compensating variation method to measure the net social impact change of the different quota systems. Under 
this proposed framework, a numerical example is conducted. This example shows that plate auction system will 
yield a higher net impact than plate lottery system. Lottery system will attract more households participating, and 
thus lowering the chances of winning for those with higher preference to own vehicles. This will lower the net 
social impact. Since the ownership quota system serves as a policy tool to fight traffic congestion, the congestion 
mitigation effect is also investigated. The auction mechanism allows people with higher preference for driving to 
own vehicles, whereas the lottery system does not distinguish between different levels preferences. Meantime, 
winners of the plate auction surrender part of their income in the auction, which decreases their driving. 
According to the numerical example, lottery system still performs better than auction system in terms of 
reduction in congestion. Also, under a more congestible network, all three ownership quota systems will provide 
a higher net social impact. 
Being a theoretical model, this paper has made several assumptions to maintain tractability of the analysis. 
Nonetheless, under all these assumptions, empirical data has supported many of the arguments in this paper. The 
low variance in Shanghai vehicle plate price have confirmed that under equilibrium status, winning bidders will 
all pay the market clearance price. Also, this study concluded that plate lottery system will attract participants 
that have lower preference of owning a vehicle.  From the numerical example, we see that this mechanism is 
harmful for the benefit of society, in terms of the aggregated net social impact. Thus, this study also proposed 
another alternative to conduct plate lottery, which is to limit lottery access to previous car owners only. This 
alternative will yield a higher net social impact comparing to the lottery that opens to everyone. 
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